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mission. Nasser was willing to give his
new war minister as close to a blank
check as could be imagined. Nothing
was more important than securing a
victory and expunging the shame of
1967. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
became a guaranteed supplier of
military hardware, not only making
up the quantitative Egyptian losses but
substantially improving equipment
quality as well. Fawzi makes the point
that the Soviets were less motivated by
a common ideology in this effort than
by the need to prove that their equipment was at least on a par with that of
the United States, and to maintain their
geopolitical position in the region. Fawzi
also confirms that the Soviet presence
on the ground was extensive, that Soviet
forces not only advised but performed
certain military duties as well.
Fawzi brought new capabilities to Egypt
and improved others. Surface-launched
ship-to-ship missiles, modern surfaceto-air missile batteries, new armor
and aircraft all entered the Egyptian
inventory. Fawzi understood, however, that new hardware would not be
enough. Military-school attendance was
increased, and the military’s intellectual capabilities expanded. But beyond
that, he explains, the three-year “war
of attrition” that Egypt waged against
Israel (1967–70) was a deliberate effort
to blood the Egyptian army, test new
tactics, and deploy new forces. Over this
period, Fawzi argues, the Israeli forces
came to embrace a defensive mind‑set,
while the Egyptian army became
imbued with the spirit of the offensive.
Although most books claim Israel won
the war of attrition, Fawzi claims this
was not the case. According to Fawzi,
not only did Israeli jets increasingly
avoid Egyptian airspace, but Egyptian

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 143

B O O K R E V I E WS

143

soldiers underwent quantum improvements as well—and these improvements
were the real war aims of this period.
It is also clear that whatever strategic
deterrent the Israeli leaders thought they
might have against the Egyptians did
not work when it came to preventing at
least a limited war. As the Egyptian army
began to believe in itself, Fawzi and his
officers crafted plans for what would
become one of the most successful setpiece battles of the twentieth century:
the 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal
and the breaching of the Bar-Lev line.
Reproducing the Infantry articles, complete with their original and somewhat
repetitive forewords, gives the book
something of a choppy feel. It is also
clear that this work is a synopsis of
Fawzi’s memoirs, not a complete translation. Some readers will be left with a
desire to know more. Not surprisingly,
the focus of the book tends to be at
the strategic level. Readers who want
more tactical details will have to find
them elsewhere. Unfortunately for our
understanding of Egyptian perspectives
of how the war was waged, Fawzi was relieved of his duties two years before the
war began and was arrested for conspiring to overthrow Sadat, so this critical
element is sadly lacking. However, these
shortcomings pale when compared
with the value inherent in this work.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military,
by George E. Reed. Lincoln, Neb.: Potomac
Books, 2015. 216 pages. $26.50.

Although the term “toxic leadership” has
recently come into vogue, the U.S. military is no stranger to the phenomenon.
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Any current or former member of
the armed forces can usually provide
a firsthand account of a leader he or
she believes was toxic. So even when a
very healthy dose of skepticism regarding anecdotal reporting is applied, it is
surprising that senior military leaders
have not paid more specific attention to evaluating to what degree toxic
leadership has affected their services’
personnel and their performance, and
to determining what to do about it.
George Reed, who carries very respectable credentials as both a former Army
officer with twenty-seven years of
experience and a civilian scholar, has at
least begun to examine toxic leadership
in the U.S. military seriously. For those
interested in understanding this type
of leadership, Tarnished is an excellent starting point. However, as Reed
is laudably quick to point out, more
work—much more work—is required.
The study of leadership is as fraught as
it is vital. There is not even a universally accepted definition of the term.
The field abounds with conflicting
theories, mountains of individual case
studies, and an ever-increasing number of blandly self-assured “how-to”
books of questionable utility. Tarnished is a welcome change of pace.
Reed begins by defining toxic leadership as “demotivational behavior that
negatively impacts unit morale and
climate.” Reed then explores how toxic
leaders behave and why; in many cases,
their seniors in the chain of command
may fail to recognize these behaviors
and even reward these leaders. This, not
surprisingly, is in marked contrast to the
perspectives of toxic leaders’ subordinates and the deep and lasting negative impact that results from working
for such a leader. Loss of productivity,
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decreased communication of necessary information to senior leaders, and
rampant dissatisfaction with not only
the leader but the service are just some
of the consequences Reed documents.
But as serious and at times tragic as
these results can be, they pale in comparison to the loss of combat effectiveness such units could experience and
the potential cumulative impact of toxic
leadership on the profession of arms.
Reed makes a convincing case that a
toxic leader’s behavior likely stems from
feelings of inferiority, which, when
combined with narcissism, creates a
potentially disastrous mix. The manner
in which toxic leadership often involves
ethical breaches is also examined.
Among the useful ideas presented in
Tarnished is that toxic leadership is best
viewed along a spectrum. At one end are
found true psychopaths, whose numbers
in the military are likely to be few. At
the other end of the scale are individuals with behaviors that may actually
be correctable, or at least mitigated.
Part of this book’s allure is Reed’s
healthy understanding of reality. He
notes that losing control in the moment or having a bad day does not
make a leader toxic. Tarnished does
offer suggestions for those sentenced to
work with toxic leaders, but Reed has
the candor to admit that these suggestions may not work. This is a refreshing
change from books that suggest that
“speaking truth to power” will result in
a happy ending, or those that, having
identified a problem, offer no solution.
This is not to suggest that Tarnished is
without flaws. In discussing specific
cases, there is a tendency to identify
toxic leaders as “a Navy captain,” or “a
visiting field officer.” If these cases are
in the public domain, then providing
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actual identities would be better.
Although it is ostensibly devoted to
military leadership, civilian cases do at
times move into the narrative. There is
also a surprising lack of historical cases.
Were Admiral King, General Patton,
and General LeMay toxic leaders?
Does the answer matter? One of the
more difficult questions involving
toxic leaders is, Do results ever trump
their behavior? Tarnished claims, quite
reasonably, that how leadership is
delivered can be as important as what
it delivers, or even more important. But
is that always true? Another question
that will leave most readers wanting
more is whether, and to what degree,
the culture of the U.S. military and the
nature of the profession of arms rewards
(some would say demands) attributes
from leaders that, if not toxic, may seem
very similar. However, when all is said
and done, Tarnished is a most welcome
addition to the discipline of leadership. It belongs in the handful of books
that should be on the shelves of both
scholars and practitioners of leadership.
RICHARD J. NORTON

The China Dream: Great Power Thinking & Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era, by Liu
Mingfu. New York: CN Times, 2015. 288 pages.
$24.99.

This 2015 publication of the English translation of The China Dream,
originally published in Chinese in 2010,
merits reading by a wider Western
audience wishing to understand a clear
exposition of a conservative, hawkish
view of China’s approach to international
relations. The author, Liu Mingfu, is a
retired People’s Liberation Army colonel.
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The book does not necessarily represent
the mainstream view of the Chinese
general public or the official Chinese
government position, but it does ring
more true to the spirit of Chinese
president Xi Jinping’s current thinking
than it did to former Chinese president
Hu Jintao’s approach when the book was
released in Chinese over five years ago.
The fact that the foreword for the book
was written by Liu Yazhou, a princeling
political commissar of the National Defense University, gives the work gravity
within the Chinese defense community.
Henry Kissinger spent four paragraphs
in On China (2011) summarizing Liu’s
views regarding China’s grand goal
to become number one in the world,
thereby restoring its historic glory.
According to Liu, this is to be done
through cultivating “martial spirit,” not
through “peaceful rise.” The inherent
conflict in U.S.-Chinese relations is
portrayed as a “marathon contest” or
“duel of the century,” as if world politics
is a sporting event between a champion
and a major contender for the global
championship. Kissinger follows his
discussion of the Liu triumphalist view
of the national destiny debate with a
much longer analysis of State Councilor
Dai Bingguo’s more moderate reaffirmation of the peaceful rise strategy.
Liu begins the first chapter by paying
homage, Chinese fashion, to his ancestors, laying out his interpretation of the
visions of Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and
Deng Xiaoping for turning China into
the world’s leading nation. Getting to
the crux of his argument in the second
chapter, “The Fight for the Century,”
Liu clearly blocks out the results of five
centuries of global political competition.
Citing George Modelski’s hegemonic stability theory that there is an approximate
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